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Johnson, David Alan Decided on the Battlefield: Grant, Sherman, Lincoln and
the Election of 1864. Prometheus Books, $27.00 ISBN 978-1-61614-509-5
At the Intersection of Military Policy and Politics
The purpose of David Alan Johnson’s book, Decided on the Battlefield:
Grant, Sherman, Lincoln and the Election of 1864, is to examine the critical
factors in 1864 that led to the re-election of Abraham Lincoln. Written for the
general audience, Johnson, a freelance writer who has authored a number of
popular histories, argues that the success or failure of Union armies determined
Lincoln’s political future, and hence the fate of the Union.
Popular history is difficult to write. It requires the author to tell a complex
story in a lively narrative and make history come alive while integrating the
latest scholarly thinking. Finding the balance between what professional
historians expect and the general public demands requires considerable skill.
Unfortunately, despite a number of strengths, Johnson’s Decided on the
Battlefield will disappoint both audiences.
Johnson builds his narrative around the military and political events of 1864,
arguing that the public mood in the North was growing restive and disillusioned.
Military defeats followed by stalemate eroded the belief in many quarters that
the Union could be saved. Additionally, dissatisfaction with Lincoln’s handling
of the war rapidly grew to the point that members of his own political party
considered nominating someone else as the Republican standard bearer. Even
Lincoln thought his own prospects for re-election were dim. Had Lincoln lost the
election of 1864, Johnson contends, the South would have won its independence.
The crucial factors that changed northern public opinion and led to Lincoln’s
re-election were the military successes of Ulysses S. Grant and William
Tecumseh Sherman. Grant’s and Sherman’s successes late in the summer of
1864, Johnson argues, were the deciding factors that permitted Lincoln to win
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the election and save the Union.
Johnson’s narrative has a number of strengths. He establishes a good feel for
the flow of events and the interplay between military action and public morale.
His discussion of the impact upon northern politics and public morale of
Confederate Jubal Early’s thrust toward Washington D.C. in June and July of
1864 is particularly insightful. Johnson also provides excellent descriptions of
how the terrain influenced military strategy for a number of the key battles
fought that summer. His account of the fall of Atlanta and the battle of Mobile
Bay are especially strong, describing the tactical difficulties facing the armies
and navies. Another strength of the narrative is Johnson’s talent for capturing the
personalities of the leading politicians and generals. Clearly an admirer of
Ulysses Grant, Johnson effectively depicts Grant’s dogged determination. While
not always balanced in his evaluations, Johnson is nevertheless clever, as for
example in how he characterized General Oliver Howard has having all the
“flamboyance of a New England pastor at a funeral" (117).
Professional historians will find little to object to Johnson’s overall
interpretive framework. They will, however, be disappointed in Johnson’s failure
to use current scholarship. Johnson relies a great deal upon the solid but very
dated works of Bruce Catton, Shelby Foote, Henry Steele Commager, and Carl
Sandburg, and upon generalized popular histories, such as Alistair Cooke,
Time-Life Books, and Wikipedia. He used few primary sources and those he did
use, he seldom quoted. Professional historians will also be frustrated by
Johnson’s overall lack of historical balance. He tends to overly praise Grant and
Sherman and overly criticize Confederate generals, particularly John Bell Hood.
The lack of historical balance is also evident in Johnson’s discussions on a
number of other issues, such as his declaration that “as far as Lincoln was
concerned, Ulysses S. Grant was the first real general he ever had….," an
unsupported statement that overly simplifies Lincoln’s hopes and expectations
for other generals (26).
Many historians will question most Johnson’s ahistorical approach. For
example, Johnson chides Lincoln for omitting the economic reasons for the Civil
War from the Second Inaugural Address, as if Lincoln believed or should have
believed that economics were the root cause of the conflict (254). Historians will
have even greater reservations with Johnson’s Epilogue which is a lengthy
speculation on “what if" Lincoln had lost the election of 1864. Making up names
of future presidents and events through the late 20th century, Johnson speculates
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on what the history of the United States and the Confederate States of America
could have been, including how those “nations" would have behaved in two
world wars, the Civil Rights Movement, and the confrontation with the Soviet
Union. While one can applaud Johnson’s imagination, such speculation more
properly belongs in historical fiction.
For many of the same reasons that historians will question Decided on the
Battlefield, general audiences will also be left frustrated. While Johnson has a
journalist’s ability to explain a complex story with a crisp and engaging style, his
narrative fails to capture the drama and passion of the time. Part of the reason
Johnson is unable to adequately describe and convey the emotions of 1864 and
1865 is because he does not let the participants speak for themselves. Not using
primary sources robs the narrative of the genuine drama of the time. A second
reason why Johnson’s book will not satisfy general audiences is the strong air of
inevitability. For example, while discussing public criticism of Grant during the
Overland Campaign, Johnson tells the reader that few people realized that “as
long as Grant kept applying pressure, Lee was bound to surrender and the war
would be over" (159). Johnson’s frequent injection of inevitability not only
drains the narrative of the real drama in the Summer of 1864, but it also makes it
impossible for Johnson to describe the uncertainty, subtleties and nuances of the
time. A third reason general audiences may be disappointed in Decided on the
Battlefield is because Johnson provides little information about the relationship
between Lincoln and Grant. This complex and highly debated relationship is
overly simplified and mostly ignored by Johnson which leaves a critically
important human aspect out of the narrative.
Good history written for general audiences fills an important educational
need in society by making scholarship accessible to the public. It requires a
special talent, which is why we celebrate authors like Doris Kearns Goodwin and
David McCullough who have succeeded in making complex historical events
and people come alive while educating the public to the intricacies and subtleties
of the past. Through the use of a lively narrative, good popular history tells a
complex story accurately and respectfully while integrating current scholarship
into the story and making the real drama of events come alive. Unfortunately,
despite its strengths, David Alan Johnson’s Decided on the Battlefield does not
meet this standard.
Stephen L. Hansen is Professor and Dean Emeritus at Southern Illinois
University Edwardsville. He currently is exploring loyalty to the Union among
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slave holders in St. Louis. He may be contacted at shansen@siue.edu.
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